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HCS473-SLROM 数据表(PDF) 43 Page - Microchip Technology |
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HCS473-SLROM 数据表(HTML) 43 Page - Microchip Technology |
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43 / 68 page ![]() 2002 Microchip Technology Inc. Preliminary DS40035C-page 41 HCS473 5.5 Transponder Design You must initially decide if a ferrite core or an air core antenna will be used. There are advantages and disad- vantages to using each. One advantage of using a fer- rite core is that the coil can have a larger inductance for a given volume. Volume will usually be the primary con- straint as it will need to fit into a: • key fob • credit card • other small package. First step: choose the transponder coil external dimen- sions because packaging places large constraints on antenna design. Second step: properties of the core, coil windings, as well as the equivalent load placed across the coil must be determined. Calculations from the first two steps will fix the initial coil specification. The initial coil specifica- tion includes: • Minimum number of wire turns on the coil • Wire diameter • Wire resistance • Coil inductance • Required resonating capacitor. Build the initial coil and take appropriate measure- ments to determine the coil quality factor. The data gathered to this point may then be used to calculate an Optimum Coil Specification. It is not this data sheet’s purpose to present in-depth details regarding LC antennae and their tuning. Please refer to “Low Frequency Magnetic Transmitter Design Application Note”, AN232, for appropriate LF antenna design details. 5.6 Security Considerations The strength of this security is based on keeping a secret inside the transmitter that can be verified by encrypted transmissions to a trained receiver. The transmitter's secret is the manufacturer's key, not the encryption algorithm. If that key is compromised, then a smart transceiver can: • capture any serial number • create a valid code word • trick all receivers trained with that serial number. The key cannot be read from the EEPROM without costly die probing, but it can be calculated by brute force decryption attacks on transmitted code words. The cost for these attacks should exceed what you would want to protect. To protect the security of other receivers with the same manufacturer's code, you need to use the random seed for secure learn. It is a second secret that is unique for each transmitter. It’s transmission on a special button press combination can be disabled if the receiver has another way to find it, or is limited to the first 127 trans- missions for the receiver to learn it. This way it is very unlikely to ever be captured. Now if a manufacturer's key is compromised, new transmitters can be created. But without the unique seed, they must be relearned by the receiver. In the same way, if the transmissions are decrypted by brute force on a computer, the random seed hides the manufacturer's key and prevents more than one transmitter from being compromised. The length of the code word at these baud rates makes brute force attacks that guess the hopping code require years to perform. To make the receiver less susceptible to this attack, make sure that you test all the bits in the decrypted code for the correct value. Do not just test low counter bits for sync and the bit for the button input of interest. The main benefit of hopping codes is to prevent the retransmission of captured code words. This works very well for code words that the receiver decodes. Its weakness is if a code is captured when the receiver misses it, the code may trick the receiver once if it is used before the next valid transmission. To make the receiver more secure it could increment the counter on questionable code word receptions. To make the trans- mitter more secure it could use separate buttons for lock and unlock functions. Another way would be to require two different buttons in sequence to gain access. There are other ways to make K EELOQ systems more secure, but these are all trade-offs. You need to find a balance between: • Security • Design effort • Usability (particularly in failure modes). For example, if a button sticks or someone plays with it, the counter should not end up in the blocked code window, rendering the transmitter useless or requiring the receiver to relearn the transmitter. Note: The exact number of turns may be tweaked such that a standard value reso- nant capacitor may be used. Note: Microchip also has a confidential Applica- tion Note on Magnetic Sensors (AN832C). Contact Microchip for a Non-Disclosure Agreement in order to obtain this applica- tion note. |
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